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I. INTRODUCTION

The money changers have fled from their high seats in the
temple of our civilization. We may now restore that temple to
the ancient truths. The measure of the restoration lies in the
extent to which we apply social values more noble than mere
monetary profit.
- Franklin D. Roosevelt,
following the Wall Street Crash of 19291
During his 2007 commencement address at Harvard
University, Bill Gates called on the graduates to invent "a more
creative capitalism" where "we can stretch the reach of market forces
so that more people can make a profit, or at least make a living,
serving people who are suffering from the worst inequities." 2 A
number of entrepreneurs, including those that started online
bookstore Better World Books ("BWB"), are doing their best to create a
more creative capitalism. 3 BWB sells approximately 10,000 books a
day and brought in $30 million in revenue in 2010.4 BWB sells its
products to return a profit and to improve worldwide literacy directly.
It increases literacy by funding book drives and collecting used books
and textbooks (through a network of over 1,800 college campuses and
partnerships with over 2,000 libraries nationwide) that it distributes
to less-developed countries. 5 Since its founding in 2003, the company
has converted more than 53 million books into over $9.46 million in
funding for literacy and education. In the process, it has diverted more
6
than 26,000 tons of books from landfills.

1.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933) (transcript available in
the National Archives), available at http://arcweb.archives.gov/arc/action/ExternalldSearch
?id=197333.
2.
Bill Gates, Address at Harvard Commencement (June 7, 2007), in HARV. GAZETTE, June
2007, available at http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2007/06/remarks-of-bill-gates-harvardcommencement-2007/.
3.
The founders of BWB were selected as Business Week's "Most Promising Social
Entrepreneurs" in 2009. Nick Lieber, The Most Promising Social Entrepreneurs, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK,
May
1,
2009, http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/may2009/
sb200905l_730988.htm?chan=smallbiz-smallbiz+index+page-top+small+business+stories.
4.
Overview: The Online Bookstore With a Soul, BETTER WORLD BooKs, http://www.
betterworldbooks.comlinfo.aspx?fzfacts (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
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Companies like BWB that measure value creation as a7
combination of profits and impact on people, the environment, or both
are emerging in increasing numbers. These entities, referred to
collectively as social enterprises, are taking on roles that have
traditionally been played by governmental and nonprofit entities. But,
unlike their nonprofit counterparts, social enterprises seek
simultaneously to have a positive impact on society and return a
profit. Their idealistic pursuit is not without obstacles, however. Many
social entrepreneurs (as the founders of social enterprises are called)8
claim that corporate law is ill-suited and outdated for their entities.
Others find it hard to differentiate their socially oriented enterprises
from companies that merely claim to benefit society, complicating
their efforts to attract capital from socially oriented investors.
One of the most creative attempts to help social enterprises
overcome the legal and marketing challenges they face is the Certified
B Corporation, an innovation created by 501(c)(3) nonprofit B Lab.
The "B" in B Corporation stands for "Beneficial."9 B Corporation
status is a third-party certification for companies, similar to the
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design ("LEED")
certification for environmentally friendly buildings. 10 The designation
of a company as a B Corporation provides third-party verification that
it operates in a socially and environmentally responsible manner.1"
Frequently, social enterprises are said to have a "double bottom-line" or a "triple
7.
bottom-line." A company with a double bottom-line measures its success by profit and
commitment to people, whether employees or members of the community. Those with a triple
bottom-line measure their success similarly, but also take into consideration the environment.
Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social EnterpriseFrontier,84 TUL.L. REv. 337,
339-45 (2009). For a broader discussion, see Alissa Mickels, Note, Beyond Corporate Social
Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a For-Benefit Corporationwith Director FiduciaryDuties
in the U.S. and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 271, 274 (2009), although it should
be noted that Mickels confuses double bottom-line for triple bottom-line, and vice versa.
Megan Scudellari, The Profits of Nonprofit, 25 SCIENTIST 54 (2011), available
See, e.g.,
8.
at http://flOOOscientist.com/article/display/57891/ (quoting OneWorld Health Founder Victoria
Hale as stating that "[tiechnology is way advanced, and it's the business models that are lagging
way behind, limiting what social entrepreneurs are able to accomplish." OneWorld Health was
the first nonprofit pharmaceutical company in the United States.).
Hannah Clark Steiman, A New Kind of Company, INC.COM, July 1, 2007,
9.
http://www.inc.com/magazine/20070701/priority-a-new-kind-of-company.html.
10. LEED is an internationally recognized green building certification system providing
third-party verification that a building or community was designed and built using strategies
aimed at improving performance across a variety of environmental quality metrics: energy
savings, water efficiency, CO 2 emissions reduction, improved indoor environmental quality,
stewardship of resources, and sensitivity to their impact. Intro-What LEED Is, U.S. GREEN
BUILDING CoUNCiL, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=1988 (last visited Mar.
26, 2011).
11. Steiman, supranote 9.

1314

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:4:1311

This verification, in turn, helps the company distinguish itself and
12
attract like-minded consumers and investors.
Unlike with C and S corporations, B Lab's B Corporations are
not a legal distinction, and have no official tax status. As a result, any
for-profit entity can seek B Corporation certification. 13 However, it
must comply with B Lab's two primary certification requirements.
First, a company must "meet comprehensive and transparent social
and environmental performance standards" set by B Lab. 14 Second, it
must amend its governing documents to incorporate consideration of
the interests of employees, the community, and the environment,
among others. 15
According to B Lab, becoming a B Corporation has implications
for investment and profit. Companies enjoy the marketing advantage
of being recognized by a third party as socially responsible. For
example, third-party certification may help companies differentiate
themselves from a growing barrage of companies claiming to prioritize
community and environmental interests. Certification thus improves
their ability to attract investment from socially responsible investors
("SRIs") and consumers. 16 SRIs seek to maximize a balance of
financial return and social good.17 Becoming a B Corporation may also
help corporate directors reconcile their duties to shareholders and
their desires to help non-shareholder constituencies, such as
employees and the greater community. In addition, incorporating
social and environmental values into their governing documents may
better position companies to ensure that those values survive new
investors, new management, and new owners.' 8 For these and other

12. Id.
13. Among others, a B Corporation may be incorporated as a C corporation, S corporation,
LLC, partnership, LLP, LP, sole proprietorship, or cooperative. Legal Roadmap,
BCORPORATION.NET, http://survey.bcorporation.netlbecome/legal.php (last visited May 11, 2011).
Nonprofit entities cannot receive B Corporation certification.
14. About Certified B Corps, BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.netlabout (last
visited Mar. 26, 2011).
15. Legal Framework, BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.netbecome/legal (last
visited May 11, 2011); Steiman, supra note 9. The choice of organizational form is not a
determinative factor in B Corporation certification, so long as the company seeking certification
is a for-profit entity.
16. The Business Case for Becoming a B Corporation BCORPORATION.NET, http:/www.
bcorporation.net/resourcesbcorp/documents/The%20Business%2CaseBecome%2a%2OB%2C
orporationl.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
17. See generally Steven J. Schueth, Socially Responsible Investing in the U.S., 43 J. Bus.
ETHICS 189 (2003).
18. Legal Framework, supranote 15.
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reasons, 407 companies, generating $1.91 billion collectively in
revenues, have already become Certified B Corporations. 19
But, while B Lab's creation has garnered an impressive
amount of excitement, it has also raised a number of legal issues that
directors of corporations considering B Corporation certification need
to understand better before making the move. 20 The imperative
question that this Note addresses is whether current Delaware C
corporation law allows a charter provision obligating directorial
consideration of stakeholders' interests. 21 B Corporation certification
requires directors to amend their charter to include a provision
obligating them to consider the interests of various stakeholder
constituencies in discharging their duties at all times. 22 But under
Revlon v. MacAndrews, Inc., Delaware has long held that directors
may not consider the interests of stakeholders once it is clear that the
corporation is "for sale."23 Because Delaware is the United States'
legal center of commerce, 24 and because Delaware corporate law
serves as the model for many other jurisdictions, B Corporations'

19. BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net (last visited May. 9, 2011).
20. Some examples of important unanswered questions surrounding B Corporations this
Note does not address include: (a) Does the inclusion of "B" stakeholders in a certificate of
incorporation create only contractual duties to stakeholders and fiduciary duties to the entity's
stockholders?; (b) May the business judgment rule serve as a shield for all directorial
decisionmaking (or directorial decisions) in a B Corporation or only those that affect purchasers
of equity in the corporation?; (c) Is it likely that institutional investors in a public corporation
would gain sufficient voting support to amend the certificate of incorporation in order to pursue a
B certification?; and (d) May a B Corporation be formed in the face of an existing "constituency
statute" that provides that directors may consider "other constituencies" in the event of a
threatened change of control? Ann E. Conaway, Lessons to Be Learned: How the Policy of
Freedom of Contract in Delaware's Alternative Entity Law Might Inform Delaware's General
CorporationLaw, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 794 & n.16 (2008).
21. The term "stakeholder" is sometimes used in legal literature as a synonym for a
shareholder, but for the purposes of this Note, a stakeholder is a person or group not owning
shares in an enterprise but affected by or having an interest in its operations, such as current
and retired employees, the suppliers and customers of a company or its subsidiaries, and the
communities and society in which the company or its subsidiaries operate.
22. Legal Framework, supra note 15.
23. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
24. More than 850,000 businesses are incorporated in Delaware, representing more than
fifty percent of all publicly traded corporations and sixty-three percent of the Fortune 500.
Division of Corporations, About Agency, DEL. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.corp
.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2011). While at present no publicly traded
corporation has registered to become a B Corporation, the success of B Lab's mission to effect
widespread social change may increase with more involvement from publicly traded
corporations. See Bill Gates, Chairman, Microsoft Corp., Remarks at the World Economic Forum
2008: A New Approach to Capitalism in the 21st Century (Jan. 24, 2008), available at
(suggesting
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/billg/speeches/2008101-24wefdavos.mspx
that "the largest companies... should lead the way" in making a profit while serving the poor).
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future success may depend on the compatibility of B Lab's stakeholder
charter provision requirement and Delaware C corporation law.
Therefore, this Note restricts its analysis to the Delaware General
25
Corporation Law and Delaware C corporation case law.
This Note addresses the need for Delaware and other states to
recognize the difference between the best interests of SRIs-a balance
of profits and social impact-and the best interests of traditional
investors-maximized profit with the least risk. It argues that, in
limited circumstances, Delaware should permit stakeholder charter
provisions that require consideration of the best interests of SRIs,
instead of imposing traditional Revlon duties. Part II of this Note
provides background information regarding the emergence of social
entrepreneurship-the use of entrepreneurial business principles to
create, organize, and manage a venture designed to effect social
change-and the advent of the B Corporation as an important player
in the field. Part III analyzes how current Delaware corporate law
would likely deal with B Lab's proposed stakeholder charter provision.
An exploration of Delaware statutory and case law will show that,
while such a provision is likely permissible in the day-to-day
operational context, it is problematic in the change-of-control context.
Part IV critiques current Delaware law and argues that it fails to
address the realities of modern shareholders' motives. Specifically,
Delaware general corporate law fails to recognize that a substantial
number of investors reject the traditional notion of profit
maximization and instead seek to maximize a balance of social impact
and profit. Part V presents the institutionalized stakeholder interest
dilemma and explains why current approaches to the stakeholder
interest debate are inappropriate to resolve this dilemma. Part VI
then proposes a solution for Delaware courts that asks whether the
stakeholder charter provision is in the best interests of each
corporation's shareholders. Part VII concludes by reemphasizing that,
because current Delaware corporate law is ill-suited to address the

25. The consideration of whether B Corporations comply with Delaware alternative entity
law is beyond the scope of this Note. In Delaware, "alternative entity" refers to those business
organizations that are both not incorporated and historically contractual in nature, rather than
statutory or regulatory entities. Thus, partnerships, limited liability partnerships (LLPs),
limited partnerships (LPs), limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs), LLCs, statutory
trusts, and uniform unincorporated associations qualify as "alternative entities." Conaway, supra
note 20, at 790 n.2. Presumably, however, B Corporations formed as alternative entities comply
with current Delaware law on charter provisions because of their ability to eliminate fiduciary
duties through charter provisions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2005)
(permitting the elimination of fiduciary duties in LLCs); id. § 17-1101(d) (permitting the
elimination of fiduciary duties in LPs).
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emerging field of social enterprise, Delaware courts should review
director decisionmaking under a 'Unocal plus shareholder awareness'
standard instead of under Revlon when companies with stakeholder
charter provisions enter a change-of-control transaction.
II. PRIVATE ENTERPRISES WITH PUBLIC PURPOSES: THE RISE OF
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND

B CORPORATIONS

A. The Emergence of Social Entrepreneurship
B Corporations can best be understood within the context of
the broader social entrepreneurship movement. Social entrepreneurs
are individuals and organizations that bring to social problems the
same kind of determination, creativity, and resourcefulness that
traditional entrepreneurs display. 26 The entities social entrepreneurs
create are referred to as social enterprises, which are social-missionto
strategies
that
employ market-based
entities
oriented
27
simultaneously return a profit and achieve their mission. Social
enterprises come in all shapes and sizes, and range from nonprofits
with business models to C corporations with social responsibility
missions. 28 Social entrepreneurs today, however, are increasingly
launching social enterprises as for-profit corporations rather than
29
nonprofits.
The language of "social entrepreneurship" emerged in the
1980s from the work of Bill Drayton at Ashoka and Ed Skloot at New
Ventures. 30 The phenomenon of social entrepreneurship, however,
existed before the 1980s. 31 One prime example of a pre-1980s social
entrepreneur is Muhammad Yunus, recipient of the 2006 Nobel Peace
Prize. 32 In 1974, while visiting a poor village in his home country of
26. J. Gregory Dees, Taking Social EntrepreneurshipSeriously, 44 SOCIETY 3, 24 (2007).
27. Academics from various fields who study social entrepreneurship have yet to settle on
one definition of "social enterprise." See Kelley, supra note 7, at 340 n.7 (noting the
disagreement). Like Professor Kelley's definition, this definition refers to the entities through
which social entrepreneurs conduct their affairs. Id.
28. OneWorld Health, the first U.S. pharmaceutical social enterprise, is a 501(c)(3)
nonprofit. Better World Books, discussed supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text, is an example
of a C corporation social enterprise.
29. See Kelley, supra note 7, at 343, 354 (noting the increased tendency to select for-profit
models).
30. Dees, supra note 26, at 24.
31. J. Gregory Dees, The Meaning of "Social Entrepreneurship" 1 (Oct. 31, 1998), available
at http://www.caseatduke.org/documents/dees-sedef.pdf.
32. Dees, supra note 26, at 24.
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Bangladesh, Yunus started making very small loans to impoverished
women in need of capital for activities ranging from making bamboo
stools to buying a dairy cow. 33 In so doing, Yunus discovered that he
could alleviate the burdens weighing on the impoverished while
making a profit. 34 After local banks refused his requests to make the
loans, Yunus founded Grameen Bank in 1976 in an attempt to provide
credit to Bangladeshis who needed capital the most. 35 Since its
inception, Grameen has extended uncollateralized small loans
(referred to as microcredit) to 8.35 million borrowers, most of whom
are women. 36 Grameen claims a ninety-seven percent repayment rate,
37
and has been profitable nearly every year.
But, while the roots of social entrepreneurship stretch back at
least a few decades, it was not until the late 1990s and 2000s that
social entrepreneurship started receiving widespread acceptance. 38 In
2005, the United Kingdom passed a law establishing a new kind of
company specifically designed for social entrepreneurs, known as a
Community Interest Company. 39 In 2007, Harvard University
Professor and renowned commentator David Gergen described social
entrepreneurship as "one of the hottest movements" among young
people in the United States 40 and "the most important movement since
the civil rights movement."4 1 In 2008, Business Week began publishing
an annual list of the most promising social entrepreneurs, and claimed
that "[s]ocial entrepreneurship isn't a niche corner of the business

33. Connie Bruck, Millions for Millions, NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, available at http://
www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/10/30/061030fafactl.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Introduction,
GRAMEEN
BANK,
http://www.grameen-info.orgindex.php?option=
comcontent&task---view&id=16&Itemid=112 (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
37. FAQ, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com.easyfaq&
task=cat&catid=80&Itemid=200 (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
38. See Dees, supra note 26, at 24 ("[Social entrepreneurship] has come into its own in the
last decade, capturing the imaginations of many thoughtful observers."); Jamie Robertson, Social
Entrepreneurs:Making Money for the Common Good?, BBC, Jan. 18, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/business-12182223 (claiming the number of social entrepreneurs today is "swelling).
http://www.cicregulator.gov.ukl
39. About
Us, COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES,
aboutUs.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2011) (discussing the Companies (Audit, Investigations, and
Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27, § 26).
40. David Gergen, The New Engines of Reform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 20, 2006, at
48.
41. Andrew M. Wolk, Advancing Social Entrepreneurship: Recommendations for Policy
Makers and Government Agencies 2 (2008), availableat http://www.rootcause.orgtsites/rootcause.
orgfiles/AdvancingSocialEntrepreneurship.pdf (quoting David Gergen).
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world anymore." 42 President Obama recently created the White House
Office of Social Innovation to increase investment in successful social
enterprises. 43 Top business schools across the United States and
Europe now offer social entrepreneurship courses and many have
44
established centers and programs to study the phenomenon.
Today, social entrepreneurs use business to create social and
environmental value alongside profits in "nearly every sector of the
economy." 45 They attempt to tackle some of the most challenging social
problems, including poverty, 46 access to clean water, 47 and the lack of
48
adequate healthcare.
Still, social entrepreneurs face many challenges. In a recent
study of one hundred social entrepreneurs, those surveyed reported
that their most pressing challenge was gaining access to investment
capital. 49 Social enterprises seeking widespread change require
significant capital investment, but social entrepreneurs are stuck
42. John Tozzi, America's Most Promising Social Entrepreneurs, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK,
June
8, 2010,
http://www.businessweek.comsmallbiz/running-small
business/archives/2010/06/americas.most-promising-sociaLentrepreneurs.html.
43. Clayton M. Christensen, The White House Office of Social Innovation:A New Paradigm
for Solving Social Problems, HUFFINGTON POST, July 1, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.coml
clayton-m-christensenthe-white-house-office-on b223759.html.
44. See, e.g., Diana Middleton, M.B.A.s Seek Social Change, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704107204574469602649140462.html
(discussing courses at Haas School of Business (Berkeley), Said School of Business (Oxford),
Tuck School of Business (Dartmouth), and Johnson School of Business (Cornell)); A Closer Look

at Business Education: Social Entrepreneurship/SocialEnterprise, ASPEN INST., (Sept. 2006),
available
at
http://www.beyondgreypinstripes.org/pdf/sereport.pdf
(noting
social
entrepreneurship coursework at Columbia, Duke, London Business School, Notre Dame, and
Berkeley, among others). The Center for Advancement of Social Entrepreneurship ("CASE") at
Duke's Fuqua School of Business is but one example of an academic center supporting the
research of social entrepreneurship. Belmont University offers undergraduate majors in the
field, see Jenny Burns, Belmont Opens Social EntrepreneurCenter, NASHVILLE Bus. J., Sept. 24,
2009, http://www.bizjournals.com/nashville/stories/2009/09/21/daily36.html
(announcing the
launch of Belmont's undergraduate major in social entrepreneurship), while Samford University
allows students to concentrate their major in Social Entrepreneurship or to minor in the same.
Academics:
Undergraduate Majors & Minors, SAMFORD,
http://www4.samford.edu/
business/academics/majors-and-minors.php (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
45. Tozzi, supra note 42.
46. E.g., Christina Binkley, Charity Gives Shoe Brand Extra Shine, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1,
2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304252704575155903198032336.html
(discussing the success of TOMS Shoes, a for-profit social enterprise that donates a pair of its
shoes for every pair purchased); Robertson, supra note 38 (highlighting the work of Pants to
Poverty, an underwear company that supports ethical production by Indian cotton farmers).
47. Robertson, supra note 38.
48. Scudellari, supra note 8 (highlighting work of the social enterprise OneWorld Health).
49. Kelley, supranote 7, at 352 (citing Ailianz, Dupont, The Skoll Found. & SustainAbility,

Growing Opportunity: EntrepreneurialSolutions to Insoluble Problems 4, 15 (2007), availableat
http://www.sustainability.com/reasearchandadvocacy/reports-article.asp?id=937).
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between a rock and a hard place when it comes to attracting capital.
On the one hand, if social enterprises form as tax-exempt nonprofits,
they must reinvest all profits into the organization and there is no
straightforward way for venture capitalists or other for-profit
investors to receive a return on their investment. 50 On the other hand,
if social enterprises form as for-profit entities, they gain more access
to investors, 51 but may subject their directors to fiduciary duty
liability for failing to maximize financial returns. 52 Thus, according to
many social entrepreneurs, corporate laws inhibit social enterprises'
5
ability to creatively and profitably solve society's challenges.
B. Beneficial Corporations:Creative Capitalism
B Lab primarily set out to resolve these capital considerations
and legal challenges by creating the B Corporation. 54 Becoming a B
Corporation may help raise capital from SRIs. B Corporation
certification signals to investors (and consumers) that an enterprise is
purpose-driven and seeks simultaneously to benefit shareholders and
stakeholders, including creditors, employees, consumers, the
55
environment, and the community in which the corporation operates.
As a result, a number of well-known companies have jumped on the B

50. Id. at 353. As Kelley points out, nonprofits may also rely on debt financing, but lenders
are often reluctant to make loans to nonprofits on competitive terms due to nonprofits'
constrained ability to repay. Id. at 354.
51. Also, organizing as a for-profit entity likely forecloses the government as a source of
funding and may limit funding from other traditional sources of nonprofit funding, such as
foundations. Id. However, a number of foundations support for-profit social enterprises today,
such as the Skoll Foundation and Ashoka.
52. Id. at 362.
53. E.g., Scudellari, supra note 8 (quoting OneWorld Health Founder Victoria Hale as
stating that "[t]echnology is way advanced, and it's the business models that are lagging way
behind, limiting what social entrepreneurs are able to accomplish.').
54. Another innovative attempt to facilitate social enterprise is the L3C, or Low-Profit,
Limited Liability Corporation. In 2008, Vermont became the first state to create an L3C statute.
Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The "Emperor'sNew Clothes" on the Low-Profit
Limited Liability Corporation,35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 880 (2010). At present, seven other states
have passed L3C legislation. Id. While there remain a number of questions about the L3C, it
appears to resolve effectively some of the challenges social entrepreneurs face. See Kelley, supra
note 7, at 371-76. Contra Kleinberger, supra.
55. See Sarah Kuck, "B" Is for Beneficial: The B Corporation,WORLDCHANGING, May 22,
2008, http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/008059.html. Jay Coen Gilbert, one of B Lab's
founders, said a goal of B Lab's is "to create a unified brand that makes it easy for consumers
and investors to identify socially responsible businesses." Thomas J. Billitteri, Mixing Mission
and Business: Does Social Enterprise Need A New Legal Approach? Highlights from an Aspen
Institute Roundtable, ASPEN INST. (2007), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.orgt
publicationslmixing-mission-business-does-social-enterprise-need-new-legal-approach.
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Better World Books, Method,
train, including Seventh Generation,
56
Flour.
Arthur
King
and
Tea,
Numi
To become a B Corporation, a business entity must receive
certification from B Lab. 57 B Lab certification involves three primary
steps. 58 First, the business organization must earn a satisfactory
grade on a survey devised by B Lab that tests the organization's
commitment to socially responsible behavior such as "democratic
decisionmaking, having good benefits, donating profits to charity, and
being energy efficient." 59 Second, it must institutionalize its
commitment to serving the interests of stakeholders by amending its
articles of incorporation and other governing documents. 60 Third, the
organization must sign a term sheet that commits the organization to
submit documents and certification fees to B Lab. 6 1 Once a corporation
earns its "B" designation, it is subject to random audits by B Lab. 62 B
Lab's audits verify the accuracy of each company's response to the
initial B survey, and are intended to ensure that companies' practices
mirror their representations. 63 If an audit reveals that a company has
B
intentionally misrepresented aspects of its business in the B survey,
64
certification.
Corporation
B
company's
the
Lab will publicly revoke
B Lab's social responsibility survey is the first system of its
kind.65 But what makes B Lab unique 66-and raises so many legal
issues-is its requirement that companies institutionalize their
commitment to stakeholders. The specific amendment that B Lab

56. Community, BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/community (last visited
Mar. 26, 2011). To date, no Delaware C corporation has received B Corporation certification.
57. Become a B Corporation,BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/become (last
visited Mar. 26, 2011).

58. Other requirements include completing an assessment review and filling out a so-called
"Declaration of Interdependence" form. Id.
59. Steiman, supra note 9.
60. Id.
61.

Id.

62. Audits, BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/audits (last visited Mar. 26,
2011).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Fair Trade Certification, developed by Fair Trade USA, preceded B Lab's B Corporation.
However, Fair Trade Certification applies to products produced and exchanged through equitable
trade practices, not to entities themselves. For more information about Fair Trade Certification,
see Certification and Your Business, FAIR TRADE USA, http://transfairusa.org/certification (last
visited Mar. 26, 2011).
66. The B Corporation charter provision is the first widespread attempt to encourage
companies to include consideration for stakeholders in their governing documents.
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recommends to institutionalize stakeholder interests requires that
directors do the following:
Consider... the social, economic, legal, or other effects of any action on the current and
retired employees, the suppliers and customers of the Company or its subsidiaries, and
the communities and society in which the Company or its subsidiaries operate,
(collectively, with the shareholders, the "Stakeholders')... [and] the effect of the
Company's operations ... on the environment and the economy of the state, the region,
and the nation.67

The recommended provision also specifically addresses the role
of directors in change-of-control transactions. The relevant portion
states:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, any Director is entitled to rely upon the definition of
"best interests" as set forth above in enforcing his or her rights hereunder and under
state law, and such reliance shall not, absent another breach, be construed as a breach
of a Director's fiduciary duty of care, even in the context of a Change in Control
Transaction where, as a result of weighing other Stakeholders' interests, a Director
determines to accept an offer, between two competing offers, with a lower price per
68
share.

Thus, according to the B Corporation stakeholder provision,
directors in a target B Corporation may consider the interests of
employees, customers, communities (both large and small), and the
environment in choosing between competing acquisition offers, even
when so doing results in a lower price per share.

The full text of the recommended charter provisions reads as follows:
In discharging his or her duties, and in determining what is in the best interests of
the Company and its shareholders, a Director shall consider such factors as the
Director deems relevant, including, but not limited to, the long-term prospects and
interests of the Company and its shareholders, and the social, economic, legal, or
other effects of any action on the current and retired employees, the suppliers and
customers of the Company or its subsidiaries, and the communities and society in
which the Company or its subsidiaries operate, (collectively, with the shareholders,
the "Stakeholders"), together with the short-term, as well as long-term, interests of its
shareholders and the effect of the Company's operations (and its subsidiaries'
operations) on the environment and the economy of the state, the region and the
nation.
Nothing in this Article express or implied, is intended to create or shall create or
grant any right in or for any person or any cause of action by or for any person.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, any Director is entitled to rely upon the definition
of "best interests" as set forth above in enforcing his or her rights hereunder and
under state law, and such reliance shall not, absent another breach, be construed as a
breach of a Director's fiduciary duty of care, even in the context of a Change in Control
Transaction where, as a result of weighing other Stakeholders' interests, a Director
determines to accept an offer, between two competing offers, with a lower price per
share.
BCorporation.net, http://survey.bcorporation.netbecomelegal.php (under "Corporate Structure,"
select "C Corporation"; then under "State of incorporation," select any of the states listed infra
note 156; then click "Next") (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
68. Id.
67.
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If the board of directors of an existing Delaware C corporation
decides to seek any amendment to the corporation's articles of
incorporation, it must call for adoption by passing a resolution setting
forth and recommending the proposed amendment, followed by a
shareholder vote on the proposal. 69 Both the board and the
shareholders must approve the amendment by a simple majority
vote. 70 Section 242 of the Delaware General Corporation Law confers
broad powers to amend a charter, subject to the requirement that the
amended articles of incorporation contain only such provisions as
would be lawful and proper in an original certificate. 7 1 Thus, whether
the B Corporation stakeholder provision violates Delaware C
corporation law depends on whether it could be included in original
articles of incorporation. It remains to be seen whether stakeholder
charter provisions similar to the B Corporation provision comply with
the Delaware corporate law.

III. How DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW MIGHT HANDLE
INSTITUTIONALIZED STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS

As social entrepreneurs and B Corporations multiply, conflicts
will likely occur between corporate law as it currently exists and the
requirement that B Corporations consider stakeholder interests. Any
provision included in a Delaware C corporation's charter must comply
with the Delaware General Corporation Law.7 2 After mandating the
inclusion of certain information in a corporation's charter, 73 section
102(b)(1) of Delaware's General Corporation Law states in relevant
part:
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of
incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorporation may also
contain any or all of the following matters:

69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2011); EDWARD P. WELCH & ANDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON
THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 2009: FUNDAMENTALS 599 (2009). Needless to say,

the process of amending corporate governance documents varies by state.
70. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242.
71. WELCH & TUREZYN, supra note 69, at 599.
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)-(b).
73. Title 8, section 102(a) of the Delaware Code requires that a company seeking
incorporation include the name of the corporation, the address of the corporation's registered
office, the nature of the business or purposes to be conducted, the number of shares to be
authorized, the name and mailing address of the incorporator(s), and the names and mailing
addresses of the persons who are to serve as directors until the first annual meeting if the
powers of the incorporator are to terminate upon the filing of the certificate of incorporation.
§ 102(a)(1)-(6).
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(1) Any provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of
the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and
regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any
class of the stockholders, or the members of a nonstock corporation; if such provisions
are not contrary to the laws of this State. Any provision which is required or permitted
by any section of this chapter
to be stated in the bylaws may instead be stated in the
74
certificate of incorporation.

Thus, the requisite inquiry for whether a provision may be
included in a corporation's charter is whether the provision is (1) "for
the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of
the corporation" or "creating, defining, limiting and regulating the
powers of the ... directors" and (2) not "contrary to the laws of [the]

State. 75 B Corporations' institutionalized stakeholder interest
7 6
provisions, like all charter provisions, must meet these prerequisites.
This Part begins by examining the first condition any charter
amendment must meet in order to comply with Delaware corporate
law. It then analyzes Delaware's treatment of stakeholder interests,
including the possibility of institutionalizing those interests, in three
main contexts: day-to-day operations, defending hostile takeover
attempts, and change-of-control transactions.
A. Requirement One: Management of the Business or Powers
of the Directors
Stakeholder charter provisions almost certainly satisfy the first
requirement of section 102(b)(1). While Delaware has never addressed
the specific question of whether stakeholder provisions relate to
corporate governance, the threshold is so low that it can be said with
reasonable certainty that stakeholder charter provisions satisfy the
first prong of section 102(b)(1). Delaware courts have long interpreted
the first prong of the 102(b)(1) test to include anything that
"facilitate[s] corporate action,"7 7 a threshold that in practice requires

only that the provision relate to corporate governance. 78 Corporate
governance is all about who has what power; it is about the
relationship among various participants in determining the direction

74. § 102(b)(1).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Frankel v. Donovan, 120 A.2d 311, 316 (Del. Ch. 1956) ("Charter provisions which
facilitate corporate action.., are normally upheld by the court.').
78. See Sagusa, Inc. v. Magellan Petroleum Corp., Civ.A. No. 12,977, 1993 WL 512487, at *2
(Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 1993) ("[Section] 102(b)(1) ... authorizes companies to include in their charters
any corporate governance provisions that do not violate Delaware law.').
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and performance of corporations. 79 The ability of directors to manage
the decisions their business makes is at the heart of corporate
80
governance.
Stakeholder provisions, such as the recommended B
Corporation provision, define and prescribe-and perhaps even
create-directorial powers. The B Corporation provision, for example,
requires directors to balance a number of considerations in
discharging their duty of loyalty.8 1 As such, it can hardly be argued
that they do not satisfy the first part of section 102(b)(1). The more
difficult question is whether they satisfy the second part of that
section.
B. Requirement Two: Do Stakeholder Provisions Violate
Delaware Common Law?
The second part of section 102(b)(1) makes clear that even if a
provision deals with the management of the corporation or defines and
limits the duties of directors, it may not be included in the charter "if
such provisions are... contrary to the laws of [Delaware]."82 Delaware
common law has shaped the responsibilities that directors have with
respect to shareholders and the corporations they serve.8 3 The most
clearly enunciated of these responsibilities are the fiduciary duties
84
directors owe to the corporate entity and to its shareholders.
Fiduciary duties are, in essence, implicit contractual terms"obligations to act in shareholders' interests, when explicit contracts
contract
are silent, in the fashion the parties would have provided by
85
costs."
transactions
without
negotiate
to
able
been
they
had
Delaware corporate law has long recognized two basic fiduciary
duties for corporate directors: a duty of loyalty and a duty of care, both
of which directors owe to the corporate entity itself and to its

79. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3-4 (4th ed. 2008).
80. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors ...").
81. See, for example, the language of the B Corporation provision reproduced supranote 67.
82. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 102(b)(1).

83. Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect
Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 772 (2009).
84. Id.
85. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 110 (1991).
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shareholders.8 6 Generally speaking, under the duty of loyalty,
directors are required to pursue the best interests of the corporation
and to place those interests above their own whenever those interests
conflict.8 7 Under the duty of care, directors must exercise good
business judgment and use ordinary care and prudence in the
operation of the business. 88 Because the standard of review for director
decisions differs at different stages in a corporation's lifecycle, this
Subpart analyzes Delaware's treatment of stakeholder interests in
three main contexts: day-to-day operations, defending hostile takeover
attempts, and change-of-control transactions.
1. Day-to-Day Decisionmaking: Business Judgment Rule
A stakeholder charter provision would most likely not cause
Delaware B Corporation directors to violate their duties of loyalty and
care when making day-to-day decisions. It is reasonably well settled in
Delaware that corporations may take into consideration the interests
of stakeholders in the day-to-day business context, unless an objecting
party can show that such consideration was not in the long-run
interest of the corporation.8 9 "Day-to-day business" refers to the
normal business operations of a corporation where directors "consider
whether to authorize a particular course of action, activity, or

86. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (articulating directors' duties);
see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ('The existence and exercise of
[directors'] power carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary obligations to the corporation and
its shareholders.").
87. See CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 246 (5th ed. 2006) ("The core of this fiduciary duty is the requirement
that a director favor the corporation's interests over her own whenever those interests conflict.").
88. Id. at 299.
89. See Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969)
(recognizing managers' rights to contribute corporate resources to socially beneficial ends in the
context of charitable donations, provided they contribute to the long-term interests of
shareholders); Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the
Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 989, 996 (1993) ("[Tlhe law has generally allowed directors
to favor nonshareholder constituencies as long as the impact on shareholders is not excessive.");
see also Kelley, supra note 7, at 350 ("Although there is still ample controversy over whether
shareholder primacy ought to rule as the underlying principle of corporate decision making, it is
reasonably well settled in most jurisdictions in the United States that corporations may take into
consideration the interests of other, broader constituencies.'). Still, Delaware courts have made
clear that directors have a duty to maximize the long-term interests of the corporation. See Katz
v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1989) ("It is the obligation for directors to
attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation's
stockholders .. ").
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transaction." 90 When reviewing decisions by directors in the day-today context, courts apply the business judgment rule absent bad faith
or self-dealing. 91 In essence, the business judgment rule is a
rebuttable presumption by courts that "in making a business decisions
the directors of a corporation act[ ] on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken [is] in the best interests
of the company." 92 It is an acknowledgement that directors are better
equipped than the courts to make business judgments. 93 Provided that
"directors are entitled to the protection of the rule, then the courts
should not interfere with or second-guess their decisions, though if
they are not, then the courts scrutinize the decision as to its intrinsic
fairness to the corporation and the corporation's minority
94
shareholders."
Delaware case law suggests that directors have substantial
leeway to act in what they perceive to be the best interests of the
corporation as an entity. 95 The Supreme Court of Delaware made clear
that "[a] board may have regard for various constituencies in
discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related
benefits accruing to the stockholders. '96 Under the "rationally related"
test, as long as the director can show that the consideration of the
stakeholder's interests are rationally related to the long-term best
interests of the company, the court will defer to the board's business
97
judgment.
Meeting the requirements of the "rationally related" test is
relatively easy for directors. For example, directors seeking to pay
employees higher salaries can justify their decision by showing it is in
the long-term best interests of the corporation because it promotes
retention. In fact, directors can connect virtually every business
decision to a rationally related benefit to the company, absent waste of
90. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 87, at 303 (explaining that in the decisional
setting, directors consider whether to authorize a particular course of action, activity or
transaction).
91. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
92. Id. Judge Kent A. Jordan of the Third Circuit has referred to the business judgment
rule as a lens through which a judge reviews decisionmaking, rather than a rebuttable
presumption. IT Group Inc. v. D'Aniello, No. 02-10118, Civ.A. 04-1268-KAJ, 2005 WL 3050611,
at *8 n.10 (3d Cir. Nov. 15, 2005).
93. Gries Sports Enter., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959, 963-64
(Ohio 1986).
94. Id. at 963.
95. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182-83 (Del.
1986).
96. Id. at 182 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)).
97. Id.; see also O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 87, at 242 (reiterating standard).
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corporate proceeds. 98 As such, commentators have noted that, as long
as you "[d]on't jerk around any constituency too badly,... you'll be
ok."99

Thus, the B Corporation charter provision most likely presents
little issue for directors in the day-to-day context. As long as directors
can show that their regard for the environment, community, or
employees is rationally related to the long-term best interests of the
company, they will receive the protections of the business judgment
rule. 100 Considering the recent research by Goldman Sachs showing
the long-term benefits higher employee compensation and
consideration of other stakeholder interests have on share prices, 10 '
there is little reason to presume that B Corporation directors would
violate their fiduciary duties to shareholders and to the corporation in
the day-to-day context. Therefore, stakeholder provisions are not
"contrary to the laws of [Delaware]" in the day-to-day business
context.
2. Defending Hostile Takeovers: Unocal's Heightened
Standard of Review
A stakeholder charter provision may, but likely does not, cause
Delaware B Corporation directors to violate their fiduciary duties
when defending against hostile takeovers. A hostile takeover is an
attempt to replace the control group of a company without its
consent. 10 2 Potential acquirers gain control without the consent of the
control group by either (1) making a tender offer seeking to buy
98. This Note does not explore the limits of the doctrine of waste, which holds that when a
director decision amounts to a waste of corporate assets, the director is not entitled to the
protection of the business judgment rule. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch.
1997) (discussing standard for waste). The Delaware Supreme Court recently reiterated how
high of a threshold claimants of corporate waste have to meet: "A claim of waste will arise only in
the rare, 'unconscionable case where directors irrationally squander or give away corporate
assets.' "In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (citation omitted).
99. Eric Talley, On the Demise of Shareholder Primacy (Or, Murder on the James Trains
Express), 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1211, 1216 (2002).
100. This is, of course, assuming directors comply with their fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty in all other respects. For comprehensive discussions about boards' duties of care and
loyalty, see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-74 (Del. 1985) (delineating the contours of
the duty of care), and Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-12 (Del. 1983) (discussing
requirements of the duty of loyalty).
101. See, e.g., GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL INVESTMENT RESEARCH, GOLDMAN SACHS GRP. INC.,

INTRODUCING GS SUSTAIN 47, 50 (2007), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/summit2007/gs_
esg-embargoed-until030707pdf.pdf (showing that socially responsible companies, and those that
pay their employees well, have a competitive advantage over their peers).
102. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 87, at 755.
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sufficient shares to gain control of the board, or (2) launching a proxy
fight seeking the authority to vote sufficient shares to gain control of
the board of directors. 10 3 To combat attempts to usurp their power,
10 4
boards of directors often employ various defensive tactics.
Delaware courts apply a heightened standard of review for
hostile takeover defensive tactics before directors enjoy the protections
of the business judgment rule. 10 5 Under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., Delaware courts will give directors the benefit of the
business judgment rule only if the directors first demonstrate that
they were responding to a legitimate threat to corporate policy and
effectiveness, and that their response was "reasonable in relation to
the threat posed."10 6 The board satisfies its burden to show a
legitimate threat to corporate policy and effectiveness "by showing
good faith and reasonable investigation." 10 7 Courts give even more
deference to board decisions regarding threats to the corporation when
the board is comprised of a majority of outside independent
108
directors.
In determining how to reasonably respond to a perceived
threat, Unocal explicitly states that a board may consider several
factors, including the "impact on 'constituencies' other than
shareholders (such as creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the community generally)." 10 9 Other factors that a board may

103. Id.
104. Id. Some of the more popular defensive tactics used in the merger mania of the 1980s
included poison pills, lock-up provisions, no-shop provisions, golden parachutes, and cancellation
protection. See id. at 762-66 (describing alternative defensive strategies); see also Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180-84 (Del. 1986) (ruling on the
permissibility of each).
105. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55 (explaining the criteria directors must meet before
enjoying the benefits of the business judgment rule). The reason for the higher standard of
review for director decisionmaking when defending hostile takeovers is the "omnipresent
specter" of entrenchment. Id. at 954. Entrenchment refers to an attempt by current directors to
protect their position on the board even when doing so is at the expense of the best interests of
the corporation. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964) (discussing
entrenchment and noting that "if the board has acted solely or primarily because of the desire to
perpetuate themselves in office, the use of corporate funds for such purposes is improper").
106. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55.
107. Id. at 955 (quoting Cheff, 199 A.2d at 555).
108. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295 (7th Cir.1981) ("rhe presumption
of good faith the business judgment rule affords is heightened when the majority of the board
consists of independent outside directors.'); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812, 815 (Del. 1984)
(discussing the role of independent directors and deference in the context of demand futility);
Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971) (applying business judgment analysis and
noting distinct independence of directors).
109. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
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consider include the inadequacy of the price of the tender offer, the
nature and timing of the offer, any illegality, the risk of
nonconsummation, and the quality of the securities being offered in
the exchange. 110 The court in Unocal, however, did not explain the
extent to which a corporation can consider the impact of a takeover
threat on constituencies other than shareholders. In Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court
clarified the extent of director consideration of the "impact on
'constituencies' other than shareholders": "Concern for various
corporate constituencies is proper when directors address a takeover
threat, [but] that principle is limited by the requirement that there be
some rationally related benefit accruing to the stockholders." ' Thus,
when defending against a takeover threat, directors' decisions to
consider the social or environmental impact of a takeover are
appropriate as long as doing so provides a "rationally related" benefit
accruing to the shareholders.
The Delaware Supreme Court shed more light on the
considerations of non-shareholder interests in Paramount v. Time,
Inc." 2 There, Paramount attempted a hostile takeover of Time while
the Time board was considering a merger with Warner. 11 3 The Time
board had spent at least four years considering various options to
allow Time to continue to operate. 1 4 Time's directors and executives
zealously sought to preserve Time's "culture"-its perceived editorial
integrity in journalism. 115 Time's board finally concluded that the
corporation had to expand to survive, and that even though
Paramount's tender offer was higher than Warner's, Warner was the
best "fit" for Time to achieve its strategic objectives. 116 The Delaware
Supreme Court held that the Time board's decision to merge with
Warner, based at least in part on its cultural "fit" with Time, was
entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule. 117 The court
found that "[d]irectors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately
conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless

110. Id. (citing Martin Lipton & Andrew R. Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors'
Responsibilities:An Update, 1983 A.B.A. NAT'L INST. DYNAMICS CORP. CONTROL 7 (1983)).
111. 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986).
112. See Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
113. Id. at 1146-48.
114. See id. at 1151-52 (explaining that Time's "deliberative approach" began in 1983-84
and ended when it decided to merge with Warner in 1988).
115. Id. at 1152.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy."'118 The
lesson from Time is clear: by ensuring the board develops a long-term
strategy for their corporation before receiving hostile bids, directors
will be able to later find protection by claiming that merging with
company X or Y will threaten their corporate plan. 119 Time thus
suggests that the preservation of a company's long-term strategy can
trump short-term profit interests and find protection under the
120
business judgment rule.
Even under a heightened Unocal standard of review, Delaware
case law tends to uphold decisions by directors to consider the impact
of a future takeover on non-shareholder constituencies; 12 1 the same
reasoning would likely extend to B Corporations. B Corporation
directors considering a hostile tender offer from an acquiring company
could likely perceive a weaker commitment to non-shareholder
interests as a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness. 122 As
illustrated by Time, a threat to a deliberately conceived, long-term
corporate culture may be a threat to corporate policy and
effectiveness. Still, it is debatable whether a B Corporation's
commitment to social responsibility could constitute a protectable
corporate policy for purposes of Unocal scrutiny. 123 If a B Corporation's
118. Id. at 1154 (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986)).
119. See id. at 1152 (finding that the Time board's decision to merge with Warner was
entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule).
120. Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: IncorporatingSocial Responsibility into the
CorporateParadigm, 11 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 631, 657 (2009).
121. Ragazzo, supra note 89, at 996.
122. The argument that a company without a demonstrated strategy to consider social
responsibility would threaten a target's policy and effectiveness is especially compelling where
the most significant component of the target's business strategy is its commitment to
stakeholders, as is often the case with B Corporations.
123. Following the drafting of this Note, the Court of Chancery of Delaware issued eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, No. 3705-CC, 2010 WL 3516473 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2010), a
distinguishable, but instructive, case on what constitutes a protectable corporate policy.
At issue in eBay was whether the directors of Craigslist breached their fiduciary duties to
eBay, a minority shareholder, by approving a rights plan that restricted eBay's ability to
purchase additional shares and to sell its shares to third parties. Id. at *1. In his opinion,
Chancellor Chandler stated that Craigslist failed to demonstrate that eBay posed a threat to its
corporate policy or effectiveness, the first prong of Unocal scrutiny. Id. at *23. He reasoned that
Craigslist failed to prove that its "public-service mission" constituted a "distinctly protectable ...
culture." Id. at *22-23. He further reasoned that even if Craigslist had a protectable culture, the
Craigslist board "did not conclude in good faith that there was a sufficient connection between
the [C]raigslist 'culture' (however amorphous and intangible it might be) and the promotion of
stockholder value." Id. at *22. In dicta, Chancellor Chandler continued: 'I cannot accept as valid
for the purposes of implementing the Rights Plan a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and
admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the
benefit of its stockholders .. " Id. at *23.
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commitment to stakeholders is found to constitute a protectable
culture, its board would comply with the first step under Unocal by
investigating the threat thoroughly and in good faith.
To comply with the second step-to respond "reasonabl[y] in
relation to the threat posed"-B Corporation directors would be able to
consider the interests of employees, communities, and the
environment as long as they could demonstrate a rationally related
benefit to shareholders from each consideration. 12 4 As previously
explained, directors have little difficulty satisfying this standard.
Therefore, even under the heightened standard of review imposed on
directors when defending hostile takeovers, B Corporation directors
may consider the interests of non-shareholders. An obligatory
stakeholder charter provision, then, may, but likely does not, cause
directors to violate their fiduciary duties when defending hostile
takeovers. It is more likely that stakeholder charter provisions violate
director duties when it is obvious that a corporation is for sale.
3. For Sale: Revlon Mode
A stakeholder charter provision would almost certainly cause
Delaware B Corporation directors to violate their fiduciary duties
when their companies go up for sale. Under Delaware corporate law,
directors' duties change when it is clear a company is for sale-that is,
in "Revlon mode." A corporation enters Revlon mode when it
undertakes a transaction that will either cause a change of control or
break up the corporate entity. 12 5 In either circumstance, directors' sole
While Chancellor Chandler's opinion may suggest that B Corporations' commitment to
stakeholders would not constitute a protectable "culture" that promotes shareholder value, it
should not. Craigslist's culture "reject[ed] any attempt to further monetize its services." B
Corporation certification does not require this sort of rejection of profit. Craigslist's commitment
to stakeholder interests was "amorphous," whereas B Corporation certification is strong evidence
that a company's commitment to stakeholders is a clearly defined part of the corporation's longterm strategy. Craigslist did not attempt to show that its public service mission rationally
related to shareholder value, whereas B Corporation directors (and all other directors) can do so
by relying on reports such as the one cited supra note 101. Additionally, eBay is a Court of
Chancery opinion, not the Delaware Supreme Court's. Thus, the debate about whether
commitment to stakeholder interests constitutes a protectable corporate policy remains open.
124. This is, as long as directors also ensure the defensive measures they take are otherwise
within the range of reasonableness. Defensive measures are within the range of reasonableness
as long as they are not draconian and the cost imposed on the corporation by the defensive
measure is not disproportionate to the benefit it provides. See generally Paramount Commc'ns
Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49-50 (Del. 1994) (explaining that defensive measures
were not reasonable because they included draconian and otherwise harmful provisions that, on
balance, hurt Paramount more than they helped).
125. Id. at 47. Revlon duties are often implicated (1) when a company initiates an active
bidding process to sell itself or to reorganize itself in a way that will clearly break up the
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duty under Delaware corporate law becomes auctioneering: they must
exercise their powers to secure the transaction that offers the highest
price reasonably available to the shareholders. 126 Rather than seek to
protect the best interests of both the corporation and the shareholders,
Revlon requires directors to stop considering the interests of the
corporate entity and instead focus exclusively on shareholder
127
interests.
What this means for stakeholder constituencies is that, under
Revlon, directors may not consider how accepting different offers will
affect their interests. The Revlon court explicitly stated that "concern
for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among
active bidders is in progress." 128 An open question exists about
whether consideration of non-shareholder interests would be
permissible if it furthered the auction process and somehow raised the
offered share price. Such a scenario, however, is extremely unlikely

company; or (2) when, in response to an active bidder's offer, a target company abandons its longterm strategy and seeks an alternative transaction with a white knight that will clearly break up
the company. Id. (citing Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990)). In
corporate law, a "white knight" refers to someone with the potential to acquire a company that
the board of directors prefers for one reason or another.
126. E.g., id. at 43 ('The consequences of a sale of control impose special obligations on the
directors of a corporation . . . reasonably to seek the transaction offering the best value
reasonably available to the stockholders.").
The duty to seek the transaction with the best value reasonably available to shareholders
originated from the famous case of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1986). In Revlon, the court was faced with the sale of Revlon in a bidding war between
two companies seeking to take control of Revlon. Id. at 176-79. In an attempt to prevent the first
hostile bidder from acquiring Revlon, the Revlon board used multiple defensive tactics aimed at
enticing a different potential acquirer to bid for control of the corporation. Revlon granted a
white knight, Forstmann, an option to purchase certain Revlon assets (the lock-up option), a
promise to deal exclusively with him in the face of a takeover (the no-shop provision), and the
payment of a $25 million cancellation fee if the transaction was aborted.
The Delaware Supreme Court found that Revlon's defensive tactics worked to the detriment
of Revlon shareholders because they effectively foreclosed the auction process. Id. at 185. Instead
of encouraging more bidding participation, and thus driving up the price that each shareholder
would gain, Revlon's defensive tactics so favored one party that any other reasonable party
would have had no incentive to offer a higher price. See id. at 184 ("Revlon had dealt
preferentially, and almost exclusively, with Forstmann throughout the contest.... Forstmann
that Pantry Pride
had been
negotiating advantage
was given nearly every
denied .. ").Since Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court has continued to hold that when it is
clear that a corporation is "for sale," directors breach their fiduciary duties unless they attempt
to secure the highest price per share that is reasonably available to their shareholders.
127. See id. at 182 ("The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon
as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders'
benefit.").
128. Id. at 182.
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and directors seeking this justification would face an uphill battle
129
against the explicit language of Revlon.
The B Corporation stakeholder provision is problematic at best
for a Delaware corporation in Revlon mode. It places directors in an
impossible situation: Delaware case law prohibits concern for the
interests of non-shareholder constituencies, while directors are under
a charter-obligated duty to consider the social, economic, and legal
effects a change-of-control transaction will have on employees,
suppliers and customers, the communities in which they operate, and
even the environment. The B Corporation charter language goes even
further and flat-out rejects Revlon's edict: consideration of nonshareholder interests shall not, "absent another breach, be construed
as a breach of a Director's fiduciary duty of care, even in the context of
a Change in Control Transaction where, as a result of weighing other
Stakeholders' interests, a Director determines to accept an offer,
130
between two competing offers, with a lower price per share.'
To illustrate the dilemma a B Corporation director faces,
assume that hypothetical Environmental Social Enterprise Corp., a
Delaware-based C corporation, faces two competing leveraged buyout
offers, one for $50 a share from a company with a reputation of
dumping toxic chemicals into rivers and one for $40 from a company
with green initiatives. Revlon obliges Environmental Social Enterprise
Corp.'s directors to accept the offer from the chemical-dumping
company, even though the new ownership would likely threaten its
environmental mission. Thus, if a B Corporation incorporates in
Delaware and finds itself in Revlon mode, its directors will invariably
breach their fiduciary duties to the shareholders, notwithstanding the
stakeholder charter provision.
However, it is not entirely clear that Delaware courts would
apply Revlon to a B Corporation in the auction process. Neither
Revlon itself nor any of the corporations since Revlon that have been
sued for breach of Revlon duties has had a charter provision placing
129. See id. ("A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders."); Leo
E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in Charge of
Control Transactions: Is There Any "There" There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1175 n.17 (2002) ("As
a general matter, the Revlon case stands for the proposition that once a board of directors either
decides to tell the company or engages in change of control transaction [sic], it must act to secure
the highest immediate value reasonable attainable."). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 983 (1992) ("[l]n [the
up-for-sale] context, considering any factors other than shareholder wealth violates the board's
fiduciary duties.").
130. See the language of the B Corporation provision reproduced supra note 67.
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an affirmative obligation on directors to consider non-shareholder
interests. 131 Under one view of Delaware corporate law, charters are
explicit contracts between directors and shareholders. 1 32 When
shareholders purchase stock in a corporation, they assent to, and are
bound by, the terms of the corporation's charter. Under this view,
shareholders might not be able to bring suit against B Corporation
directors for considering non-shareholder interests because they
assented to this consideration when they purchased shares. 133 Still,
Delaware law does not permit corporate organic documents such as
charters to redefine director fiduciary duties. 134 In general, a charter
amendment may not derogate from common law rules if doing so
conflicts with some settled public policy. 135 In light of the longstanding policy that directors must maximize shareholder wealth once
a company is for sale, 136 Delaware courts would most likely find the B
Corporation charter provision invalid because it conflicts with public
policy. But should they?
IV. BLENDED VALUE: WHY DELAWARE COURTS SHOULD ALLOW B
CORPORATION DIRECTORS TO CONSIDER STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS IN

REVLON MODE
Delaware should allow B Corporation directors to consider
stakeholder interests, even in Revlon mode, to allow directors to
protect the "best interests" of B Corporation shareholders. While
directors in Revlon mode can no longer seek to protect the corporate
entity, they still have an affirmative obligation to protect the best
interests of the shareholders. Directors' own views about the longterm interests of the target corporation are irrelevant because it will
131. An internet search using Westlaw did not reveal any instances of a Revlon claim filed
against a Delaware corporation with a charter-based obligation to consider nonshareholder
interests.
132. WELCH & TUREZYN, supranote 69, § 242.2 (speaking about a charter in terms of being a
contract both between shareholders and the corporation, and between shareholders themselves).
133. See id. (stating that Delaware corporate law assumes shareholders are aware of and
consent to the terms found in a corporation's charter when they purchase shares).
134. Bainbridge, supra note 129, at 985.
135. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952); ERNEST L. FOLK, III,
THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 10 (1972).

136. See generally Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. 637 A.2d 34, 47-48 (Del.
1994) ('"There are few events that have a more significant impact on the stockholders than a sale
of control or a corporate break-up. Each event represents a fundamental (and perhaps
irrevocable) change in the nature of the corporate enterprise from a practical standpoint. It is the
significance of each of these events that justifies: (a) focusing on the directors' obligation to seek
the best value reasonably available to the stockholders; and (b) requiring a close scrutiny of
board action which could be contrary to the stockholders' interests.").

1336

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 64:4:1311

cease to exist.137 When the sale consists of a stock-for-stock
exchange, 138 B Corporation shareholders will become shareholders in
the new entity, and thus, how the new entity performs and operates
will affect the best interests of the shareholders. Even when the sale
involves the sale of shares, the views of shareholders are relevant
because it is their money that they stand to gain or lose.
Generally speaking, the determination of what is in
shareholders' "best interests" involves inquiry into what the
bargaining parties would have wanted had they been able to freely
negotiate without transaction costs. 3 9 In the context of a B
Corporation change-of-control transaction, the relevant inquiry would
be: Which offer would the B Corporation shareholders have accepted?
Delaware courts conducting this inquiry apply a "reasonable person"
standard.' 40 As discussed in Part III, Delaware has long concluded
that the best interests of reasonable shareholders, when it is clear the
corporation will no longer exist, are to generate the most wealth at the
least risk.
There is strong evidence to suggest that the vast majority of
corporate shareholders would have bargained for the greatest
financial return at the least risk.' 4 ' This can be observed through
equity offerings: companies with historically poor-performing stock
struggle to find capital, while high-growth companies easily attract
capital. Investment in ethical funds, although growing, is still only an

137. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(requiring directors to stop protecting the "corporate bastion").
138. A stock-for-stock exchange is when shareholders of the target corporation will receive
stock in the acquiring corporation. Usually, the relative value of the stock in the new corporation
is more valuable, a phenomenon referred to as a "share premium."
139. See Lawrence Scheinert, Countering the Stoneridge Critics: The Prudence of
Maintainingthe Status Quo for Lawyer Liability Under Rule 10B-5, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1,
24 (2009) ("The corollary inquires into what the bargaining parties would have wanted had they
been able to freely negotiate without transaction costs. This question yields the Pareto efficient
outcome by approximating what the parties would have bargained for."). The Pareto method
approximates what parties would have bargained for in order to achieve the most wealth for both
parties.
140. See id. at 25 ("mo determine what the parties would have wanted, the best approach is
simply to ask what a reasonable person in their situation would want.").
141. A fundamental assumption of economists' models of the corporate and capital markets
is that shareholders are interested in maximizing wealth and avoiding risk. Indeed, this is the
basic premise of Market Portfolio Theory, the historically dominant investment theory. Legal
scholars such as Stephen Bainbridge claim that maximization of profit promotes the best
interests of shareholders because the more wealth that is created, the better it is for everyone.
For more background on this topic, see EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL, supra note 85, at 43. See
also Strine, supra note 129, at 1184-87 (discussing differing views and exposing the ethical
considerations of them).
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estimated nine percent of the total funds under management.142
Further support for the wealth-maximization assumption is found in
litigation behavior. Shareholders almost universally bring suits
against directors when they believe a director decision has caused the
143
economic value of their investment somehow to be jeopardized.
Rarely do social-responsibility-related shareholder proposals receive
more than trivial support. 144 Thus, Delaware's long-standing policythat the best interests of shareholders in a change-of-control
transaction is receiving the highest price per share-appears to reflect
the preferences of the high majority of investors.
Nonetheless, this broad assumption raises questions and may
be inappropriate in the context of B Corporations. Is it an accurate
assumption that the best interests of all shareholders in every changeof-control transaction is the same, namely an interest in maximized
profit? Could there be some class of investors whose "best interests" do
not involve an unqualified commitment to the highest price per share?
Are there circumstances when it would be in shareholders' best
interests to grant directors discretion to discriminate between
competing acquirers based on their commitment to stakeholders, even
when doing so might cause shareholders to lose profits? If there are
such circumstances, should Delaware courts continue to prohibit
directors from considering stakeholder constituencies in change-ofcontrol transactions?
The theoretical problem with the reasonable person standard,
as applied by Delaware and other states, is its uniformity: all
investors are assumed to want the same thing. Of course, in reality,
that is simply not true. Unlike traditional investors, SRIs seek to
maximize a balance of financial return and social good. 145 SRIs
142. Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the "?esponsible" Shareholder, 10
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 31, 53 n.189 (2005) (citing Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and
Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1268
(1999)). Ethical funds refer to funds under professional management that use social "screens" to
avoid products that were not produced in a socially responsible manner and/or to encourage
socially responsible practices. Williams, supra, 112 HARV. L. REV. at 1268.
143. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36 (Del. 1994)
("QVC and certain stockholders of Paramount commenced separate actions . . . against
Paramount."); Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1990)
(explaining that shareholder plaintiffs argued that Time's board failed to maximize shareholder
value); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
144. O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 87, at 221.
145. See Robertson, supra note 38 (discussing preferences of social investors). Of course, the
preferences of investors do not separate perfectly into the dichotomy of so-called "traditional"
investors and SRIs. In truth, investing preferences run a spectrum, and investing is less a tradeoff between social and financial interest and more of an embedded value proposition composed of
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express their values on issues like social justice and the environment
through investing in companies that they believe will have a positive
social impact. 146 They expect that companies will consider the impact
business decisions will have on constituencies like employees,
communities, and the environment. 147 Such an altruistic motive does
not fit neatly within economic models of the corporation that provide
justification for the uniform reasonable person standard. 148 If given
the opportunity to bargain without transaction costs, most SRIs would
want directors to consider how each business decision, especially
major decisions such as mergers or takeovers, would affect other
constituencies. Therefore, their best interests-especially in Revlon
mode-are not obtaining the highest price per share, but rather
achieving the maximum balance between share price and social
impact.
An acknowledgement that different investors have different
interests raises another problem: Shareholders in most corporations
(and certainly all publicly traded corporations) are a combination of
traditional and socially responsible investors, so how do courts
simultaneously protect all shareholders' best interests? The short
answer is they cannot protect them all. But courts could align their
decisions more closely with modern realities of diversely interested
shareholders by inquiring whether the supermajority of the
shareholders is more traditional or is more socially responsible. The
vast majority of companies that come before the courts will continue to
consist of a supermajority of traditional investors. However, a small
minority, including B Corporations, will consist of predominantly
SRIs. In these limited circumstances, Delaware courts should permit
directors to discriminate between potential acquirers based on the
impact change-of-control
transactions
will have on other
constituencies.

both. Jed Emerson, The Blended Value Proposition:Integrating Social and FinancialReturns, 45
CAL. MGMT. REV. 35, 38 (2003).
146. See Schueth, supra note 17, at 189 ("Socially conscious investors believe that they can
make money and make a meaningful difference by consciously directing investment capital
toward enterprises that contribute to a clean, healthy environment, treat people fairly, embrace
equal opportunity, produce safe and useful products, and support efforts to promote world
peace.').
147. Id.; Elizabeth Wine, SRI Plows the Path to Profitability, ON WALL ST., Aug. 1, 2009, at
28,
available
at
http://www.onwallstreet.com/ows issues/2009_-8/sri-plows-the-path-toprofitability-2663476-1.html.
148. See Lee, supra note 142, at 55 ("[Slocially responsible investing is awkward for some
economic theorists of the corporation because it contradicts the assumption of investor singlemindedness....").
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Other commentators have also suggested that the views of
shareholders should be relevant to courts. For example, Ian Lee
makes a strong case for why the views of shareholders should be
relevant to the exercise of managers' faculties: "In the exercise of
managers' ethical faculties, the views of shareholders are ... relevant
because the shareholders have money at stake in a departure from
profit maximization: the profits would otherwise be for their
149
benefit."
The sanctity of the corporate form will not be sacrificed by
acknowledging the best interests of some investors, even in a sale
context, are not maximized profits. The corporate form has facilitated
more prosperity than any other economic form in human history, and
Delaware courts would be unwise to shift their understanding of the
form drastically. Major changes usually harm more than help, due in
large part to the uncertainty they create. But the corporate form
periodically needs incremental changes to ensure laws align with the
realities of the modern marketplace.1 50 More than ever, the market
does not consist of investors seeking only financial prosperity; instead
it includes a range of investors seeking to effect social change through
15
their investment preferences. '
Such an acknowledgement may strengthen the corporate form.
While Delaware has stated that directors should not have to focus on
short-term profits, 15 2 the recent financial crisis exposed some of the
pitfalls of the current corporate system. 153 Permitting directors to
consider stakeholder interests in limited circumstances will help
corporations again operate with the vision necessary to promote
sustainable and long-term success, rather than focus exclusively on

149. Id.
150. For example, the SEC recently made amendments to bring securities law in line with
the "realities of the modern marketplace." Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in
Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 8828, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,116, 45,117 (proposed Aug. 10,

2007).
151. Emerson, supra note 145, at 35-39.
152. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 1150 (Del. 1985) ("[Ihe
question of 'long-term' versus 'short-term' values is largely irrelevant because directors,
generally, are obliged to chart a course for a corporation which is in its best interests without
regard to a fixed investment horizon.").
153. See Marjorie Kelly, Not Just For Profit, 54 STRATEGY & Bus. 1, 4 (2009), available at
http://www.bcorporation.net/resourceslbcorp/documents/strategy+business.pdf
('The financial
meltdown of 2008 was a direct result of the pursuit of immediate profit by investment bankers
and mortgage brokers who disregarded the impact of their actions on customers, on the larger
economy, and indeed on stockholders and the company itself in the long term.").
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quarterlies. Most jurisdictions have already recognized the need to
154
address the shareholder-stakeholder debate.
V. THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT STAKEHOLDER SOLUTIONS
While various states have adopted potential solutions to
address the interests of stakeholders in the change-of-control context,
these approaches do not serve the best interests of corporate
shareholders. This Part considers and rejects two such proposals: (1)
passing a constituency statute to amend a director's duty of care; and
(2) incorporating as a benefit corporation in either Vermont or
Maryland.
A. Stakeholder Constituency Statutes
The most common "solution" to allow corporate directors to
consider stakeholder interests is to pass a stakeholder constituency
statute. In response to Revlon, a number of states passed constituency
statutes. 155 Thirty-one states now have some version of the statute;
Delaware, noticeably, does not. 156 Typically, constituency statutes
exist as amendments to statutory statements of a director's duty of
care. 157 In most cases, constituency statutes provide that in fulfilling
managerial duties of care, directors may consider the effects of a
decision not only on shareholders, but also on a list of other
constituency groups. 158 These permissible constituency groups usually
include employees, creditors, suppliers, consumers, and the
community at large.1 59
The biggest problem with constituency statutes is that because
they apply to all C corporations, they are often not in the best
interests of shareholders.For example, denying a bid from the highest
bidder, who believes firm value will increase if it shuts down a factory,

154. For states' responses, see Part V and accompanying footnotes, infra.
155. See Bainbridge, supra note 129, at 993-94 (explaining that Indiana's constituency
statute was "obviously drafted in response to a pair of Seventh Circuit decisions" agreeing with

Revlon).
156. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 8-209 (2008) (noting that Arizona, Connecticut, Florida,

Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming have constituency statutes).
157. Conaway, supranote 20, at 794 n.16.
158. Bainbridge, supra note 129, at 986.
159. Conaway, supranote 20, at 794 n.16.
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hurts shareholders' return on investment. 160 As explained in Part IV,
the vast majority of shareholders still invest for the sole purpose of
maximizing their financial return, 16 1 and while more and more
investors would prefer directors consider the interests of employees,
most still would not. Because constituency statutes do not distinguish
among the varying interests of modern investors, they likely hurt
more investors than they help. Constituency statutes may also hurt
shareholders because they provide unchecked protection for selfinterested directors. 162 Self-interested directors can always claim that
their decision to accept one hostile offer instead of another was to
protect employee jobs, when in fact that decision may have been
163
motivated by entrenchment.
If the Delaware legislature passed a constituency statute
similar to those adopted by other states, not only would it hurt the
majority of shareholders, it could also expose B Corporation directors
to personal liability in the takeover context. This might occur because
the interests protected in the B Corporation charter provision are
different from the interests protected by existing constituency
statutes. For example, the suggested B Corporation stakeholder
charter provision states that directors "shall ...consider ... the effect
of the Company's operations (and its subsidiaries' operations) on the
environment," 164 but current constituency statutes omit any protection
for directors who base decisions on consideration for the
environment. 165 If the Delaware legislature passed a similar
constituency statute, corporate directors could not consider the effect
of their decisions on the environment. 166 Therefore, the Delaware
legislature should not pass a constituency statute because these
statutes frequently cause directors to hurt shareholders' best interests
and may not actually exculpate directors from personal liability.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

This, of course, assumes that employees are not shareholders, which is often the case.
See supraPart IV.
Bainbridge, supra note 129, at 972.
Id.
See supranote 67.
Conaway, supra note 20, at 794 n.16.
The Delaware legislature could avoid this problem by becoming the first state to include

director protection for the environment. This change alone, though, would still fail to protect B
Corporation directors adequately. To do so, the Delaware legislature would also need to ensure
that the non-shareholder interests enumerated in a constituency statute are the same as those
interests enumerated in B Lab's charter provision. For example, it would also need to include
language permitting consideration of "the effect of a company's operations on the economy of the
state, the region and the nation."
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B. Benefit CorporationLegislation
Another proposed solution is for Delaware to pass benefit
corporation legislation. At present, four states-Maryland, New
Jersey, Vermont, and Virginia-have passed legislation providing for
the creation of benefit corporations.1 67 Benefit corporations are distinct
legal forms, independent from other corporate forms. 168 Under
Maryland, New Jersey, Virginia, and Vermont law, a benefit
corporation only has to be organized for the furthering of some
"general public benefit."'169 All four laws define general public benefit
as "a material positive impact on society and the environment."' 170 In
Maryland, New Jersey, Virginia, and Vermont, a beneficial
corporation's positive impact on society and the environment must be
measured by a third party, such as B Lab.1 7' Importantly, beneficial
corporation legislation explicitly protects directors' decisions seeking
to further the corporation's stated public interests. It does so through
a provision stating that the creation of general public benefit is in the
best interests of the benefit corporation, 72 and a provision exculpating
directors from fiduciary duty violations for considering the interests of
73
the general public.
For those entities willing to form as a Maryland, New Jersey,
Vermont, or Virginia benefit corporation, their directors will not likely
face the director dilemma presented in this Note because the

167. Maryland was the first state to pass benefit corporation legislation, doing so on April 13,
2010. MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 5-6C (West 2010). Vermont followed by passing
legislation on May 19, 2010. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 21 (2010). Virginia and New Jersey passed
similar legislation in early 2011. Public Policy, BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation
.net/publicpolicy (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). Other states that are currently considering benefit
legislation include California, Colorado, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maine, North Carolina, New
York, and Oregon. Fiscal and Policy Note (Revised), S.B. 690, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2010), available at http:lImlis.state.md.us2010rs/fnotesbilOOOO/sbO690.pdf. In New York,
the Senate has approved a draft version.
168. At this point, it should be clear that B Lab's Certified B Corporation and benefit
corporation legislation differ in significant ways, most importantly because Certified B
Corporations are not a legal status, while benefit corporations are.
169. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS, § 5-6C-01(C); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5(a); VA. CODE

ANN. § 13.1-787(A); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08(a).
170. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS, § 5-6C-01(C); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:1; VA. CODE

ANN. § 13.1-782; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(4).
171. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS, § 5-6C-01(C); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:1l(a)(2); VA.

CODE ANN. § 13.1-791(A)(2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(4).
172. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. llA, § 21.08(c).
173. Id.
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legislation in each of these states was modeled after the recommended
174
B Corporation charter language.
Benefit corporation legislation is a significant step, and one
deserving praise for its ingenuity. 175 However, the legislation does not
apply to C corporation directors. The reasons for choosing one
corporate form over another are beyond the scope of this Note, but
companies planning to seek institutional investors would most likely
not find this "solution" very useful: most institutional investors prefer
investing in C corporations and shy away from companies formed as
alternative entities. Presumably, applying this same reasoning,
institutional investors would shy away from a company formed as a
benefit corporation. Therefore, recent benefit corporation legislation
appears to be useful for social entrepreneurs willing to forfeit the
potential capital benefits of a C corporation, but useless for C
corporation directors.
VI. SOLUTION: BRINGING CORPORATE LAW IN LINE WITH THE REALITIES
OF MODERN MARKET PRACTICE WITHOUT COMPROMISING
176
SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION

Delaware corporate law needs to adapt to the realities of
investment preferences in modern market practice. While there have
always been investors who invest based on their preferences, the
number of investors today who seek to affect society through their
investment choices has grown and continues to grow.' 7 7 At the same
time, the vast majority of investors still prefer to maximize their

174. See Public Policy, BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/publicpolicy (last
visited Apr. 25, 2011) (discussing and linking to model legislation created by an attorney for B
Lab).
175. For more information about benefit corporation legislation, see Elizabeth Hang, Steven
Haymore, Dirk Sampselle & Larry Vranka, The Need and Rationale for the 'Benefit
Corporation': Why it is the Right Legal Solution for Using the Power of Business to Solve Social
Problems (Apr. 1, 2011) (unpublished white paper) (on file with author).
176. In 2007, the SEC proposed revisions to the rules applicable to private and limited
offerings. Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release No.
8828, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,116 (proposed Aug. 10, 2007). The Commission's objective was to clarify
and modernize the rules to "bring them into line with the realities of modern market practice
and communication technologies without compromising investor protection." Id. at 45,117. This
Part of the Note proposes revisions to director obligations under Revlon in a way that similarly
attempts to bring corporate governance into line with the realities of the modern market practice
while still maintaining protection of investors.
177. As of 2008, socially responsible investing accounted for nine percent of all investments
in the market. Lee, supranote 142, at 53 n.189; see also Schueth, supranote 17.
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financial return at the least risk. 178 The most appropriate solution
then to the institutionalized stakeholder interest debate preserves the
current protection afforded to traditional investors, while permitting
socially responsible investors and the corporations they invest in to
sacrifice profits for social impact.
In determining the best interests of shareholders in change-ofcontrol transactions, however, Delaware courts should seek to
ascertain the economic as well as social interests of the shareholders.
To this end, Delaware courts should implement a different change-ofcontrol standard of review for corporations with stakeholder charter
provisions than Revlon. Under this new test, directors of general
corporations with stakeholder charter provisions would receive the
protections of the business judgment rule so long as they show that
(1) a reasonable, unsophisticated investor would have been aware of
the corporation's commitment to stakeholders even when it was clear
the company was for sale; 179 (2) there was a threat to corporate policy
and effectiveness; and (3) the response was reasonable in relation to
the threat posed. Noticeably, this test involves a combination of the
Unocal heightened scrutiny test with a new element attempting to
ensure investors understand the risk they take-sacrificing profits in
return for the prospect of social impact.
The determination of whether a reasonable investor would
have been aware of the corporation's commitment to stakeholders is
fact-specific, but directors should not be able to claim this protection
unless the name and logo of the corporation indicates that it operates
for the benefit of society as well as shareholders. The appropriate
means of identification could include a small "B" within a circle,
similar to the symbol for trademark or registered, as well as a phrase
written below the corporation in small font: "A Beneficial
Corporation." This symbol and accompanying phrase will serve as a
useful identification to alert the public of the distinction between B
Corporations and traditional corporations. Directors should also be
required to include a provision in the prospectus and on the stock
certificate explaining that beneficial corporation directors may accept

178. '"Traditionar' investors accounted for approximately ninety-one percent of the market.
See Schueth, supra note 17 (noting that socially responsible investors account for 9.4 percent).
179. This standard, admittedly, creates a legal fiction. Because of the practical impossibility
of determining the specific preferences of individual investors, it is a presumption that a
reasonable investor would notice and understand the significance of a company being a B
Corporation. As awareness of B Corporations increases, this presumption will become more
valid.
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a lower price per share in the event of a sale if they believe doing so
will be more beneficial to the enumerated stakeholders' interests.
Like under Unocal and Time, the "corporate policy and
effectiveness" of B Corporations should include more than just a
threat to profits. It should include a threat to the corporation's
commitment to employees, creditors, and other stakeholders as
enumerated by the charter. A corporation's response based on its
threatened commitment to stakeholders, however, should not be
deemed reasonable if a corporation accepts a lower price per share
from a hostile bidder where it is clear that a higher financial offer will
also create a higher social impact. In other words, to accept a lower
offer, directors must show that the offer was more beneficial to the
interests of the stakeholders enumerated in the charter.
"Social impact," for the purposes of change-of-control
transactions, should be determined by the specific protections in the
charter of the target corporation. Where the target corporation
commits to protecting the interests of employees and the broader
community as well as to operating in an environmentally friendly way,
the standard for shareholder social welfare would be how committed
the acquiring company is to the interests of the target's employees, the
target's communities, and the target's environmental plan.180
VII. CONCLUSION
The legal question presented by the Certified B Corporation
stakeholder charter provision tackles the very heart of corporate law:
For whose benefit should the corporation operate? Should the
corporation exist exclusively to benefit shareholders or to benefit
shareholders and society?1 8 ' Delaware corporate law has taken a
middle-of-the-road approach by permitting director consideration of
non-shareholder interests until it is clear a corporation will change
control or break up. In the takeover context, it remains to be seen how
Delaware courts will react to the mandatory language of the
stakeholder interest provision in B Corporation charters. Under
Revlon and its progeny, however, Delaware courts most likely will
180. Evidence of an acquirer's "commitment" to social responsibility may include provisions
in charters or bylaws, company codes of conduct or ethics, and past practices, among others.
Because of the inherent subjectivity of determining how committed potential acquirers are to the
interests of a target B Corporation's stakeholders, courts should strongly defer to the judgment of
B Corporation directors.
181. See, e.g., Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation,
64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964) (summarizing the entirety of the seminal corporate purpose
debate between Adolph E. Berle and E. Merrick Dodd).
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deem the provisions to violate the directors' auctioneer duties. At the
very least, the tension between Revlon and B Corporation charters
makes for a difficult policy decision by Delaware judges. Rather than
apply a bright-line rule to all investors, Delaware should adopt this
Note's proposed test as a way to facilitate socially responsible
investing while protecting the majority of investors who exclusively
seek to profit financially.
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